The Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, analyzing the experience and results of previous work and defining the tasks of the next period of struggle for the building of communism, stressed that "the problem of ideological struggle increasingly comes to the fore, and the truth about socialism is the most powerful tool in this struggle.".

Plutarch, in his work,_ Peri __Deisidaimon_ia_ __,_ presents a striking portrayal of superstition in the First Century. The Philosopher who also served for decades as a priest of Apollo portrays the pernicious effects of some supposed religious practices as worse than the outcome of atheism. His position constitutes a forceful explanation to ostensibly controversial socio-religious behaviours. This article discusses some of the priest’s concerns as well as his rebuff of religious attitudes that are borne out of what he describes as (...) misrepresentation of the gods or superstition. Plutarch’s essay is seen as illustrating a reason for a socio-religious situation in Africa, a continent that shares a similar religious background with the world of the writer. Specifically, with the example of the hard fight against street begging in some parts of Nigeria, the article shows how social reform programmes could fail when effects of traditional African beliefs and cultural practices remain potent. __. (shrink)

Two years ago, astrophysicists studying Type Ia supernovas discovered that our universe is a much stranger place than we had imagined, with invisible vacuum energy accelerating its expansion. (See my column about this in the May-1999 Analog.) However, new astrophysical observations from the BOOMERanG experiment (Balloon Observations Of Millimetric Extragalactic Radiation and Geomagnetics), a balloon-borne cryogenic microwave telescope measurement that flew at an altitude of about 24 miles over the Antarctic, indicate that our universe is also rather ordinary, in that (...) its space is maximally flat. The term “flat” as used here means that the space of our universe is neither positively curved like a ball or negatively curved like a potato chip. It appears that in our universe, the tendencies of space toward positive curvature from gravitational attraction and towards negative curvature from expansion kinetic energy are precisely in balance, leaving space on the average completely free of curvature. (shrink)

In October-2010 the headlines of the science press were dominated by the announcement of the discovery of a “Goldilocks Planetâ€, Gleise 581g, which has a mass not too different from that of the Earth and has an orbit squarely in the middle of the habitable zone of its parent star. It was supposed to be not too hot, not too cold, but just right for the evolution of life. Steven Vogt of UC Santa Cruz, the lead author of the paper, (...) was quoted (out of context) as saying, “The chances of life on the planet are 100%.†Now that some of the dust has settled concerning this reported discovery, I’d like to have a look at the work behind the announcement and consider its present status. (shrink)

This is the first volume in a three-volume work that explores the influence of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical thinking in Golden Age Denmark. The work demonstrates that the tradition of Danish Hegelianism played a profound role in many spheres of the Golden Age culture.

Grigorii Savvich Skovoroda was a distinguished philosopher of the eighteenth century Ukraine who made a significant contribution to the development of philosophical thought and enlightenment ideas. A contemporary of N. I. Novikov, Ia. P. Kozel'skii, and A. I. Radishchev, he reflected in his work the protest of the laboring peasant masses against serfdom. This protest was the starting point for his philosophical interpretation of the world, man, problems of social justice, and the paths along which they could be resolved. Representing (...) the antifeudal movement for enlightenment in the Ukraine, he linked the freedom of his people to unification of the Ukraine with Russia and to the general struggle for implementation of anti-serfdom ideals. (shrink)

In seinem Sendschreiben an Fichte aus dem Jahr 1799 bekennt F.H. Jacobi emphatisch, daß er Fichte für »den wahren Meßias der speculativen Vernunft, den echten Sohn einer Verheißung einer durchaus reinen in und durch sich selbst bestehenden Philosophie« halte: »Eine reine, das ist, durchaus immanente Philosophie, eine Philosophie aus Einem Stück, ein wahrhaftes Vernunft-System, ist auf die Fichtesche Weise allein möglich«.

In seinem Sendschreiben an Fichte aus dem Jahr 1799 bekennt F.H. Jacobi emphatisch, daß er Fichte für »den wahren Meßias der speculativen Vernunft, den echten Sohn einer Verheißung einer durchaus reinen in und durch sich selbst bestehenden Philosophie« halte: »Eine reine, das ist, durchaus immanente Philosophie, eine Philosophie aus Einem Stück, ein wahrhaftes Vernunft-System, ist auf die Fichtesche Weise allein möglich«.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Resumen:Junto con Rebeldes académicos de Iván Jaksić (SUNY 1989; UDP 2013) y Una disciplina de la distancia de Cecilia Sánchez (CESOC 1992), este libro ya forma parte del canon bibliográfico selecto y escaso que propone investigaciones de largo aliento sobre la historia de la filosofía en el Chile republicano. No se trata de una reseña de nombres y obras, ni de una historia interna del desarrollo de problemas puros o escuelas. Más bien, su foco, en afinidad con las obras mencionadas, (...) son “las distintas relaciones históricas entre las fuerzas del poder y las razones de la filosofía […] las distintas inscripciones en los también múltiples quiasmos entre saberes y poderes” (14-15), asumiendo, de modo más sustantivo, que “el bloque histórico dominante en Chile rara vez ha logrado establecer un relato coherente de la dominación, justamente porque es poco lo que le importan las razones en nombre de las cuales ejerce la fuerza” (41). (shrink)

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

Solidarity, a modern word and concept, has old roots in the concept of koinonia (fellowship) as it is understood in the New Testament. David G. Horrell even maintains that what we now call solidarity, functions as a meta norm in Paul’s ethics, since phenomena of solidarity are clearly present in the central elements of Paul’s community building. Reference is made to the two basic rituals, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, which build unity in diversity; to the most frequently used form (...) of address, adelphoi/brothers, which asks for familial treatment of one another; also to the special way in which Paul often tries to restore unity in the middle of conflicts; and especially to his metaphor of the Church as the one body of Christ with many different parts that need and support one another. When speaking about the collections as a sign of the Greek community’s solidarity with the poor community in Jerusalem, Paul refers to Christ’s solidarity as the source of solidarity within and among communities. Keywords: Solidarity, fellowship, David Horrell, Paul, Ethics, baptism, the Lord’s Supper, brothers, Body of Christ, Christ’s solidarity. Abstrak: Solidaritas, sebuah kata dan paham modern, memiliki akar yang lama, antara lain dalam paham koinonia (persekutuan), sebagaimana digunakan dalam Alkitab Perjanjian Baru. David G. Horrell mempertahankan bahwa apa yang sekarang kita sebut solidaritas, merupakan norma dasar (meta norm) dalam etika Paulus, sebab fenomen-fenomen solidaritas tampak dalam unsur-unsur sentral pembinaan jemaatnya, antara lain dalam kedua ritual paling dasar, baptisan dan perjamuan Tuhan, yang membina kesatuan dalam perbedaan. Solidaritas juga muncul dalam sebutan paling frekuen, saudara-saudara (adelphoi), yang menuntut suatu etos kekeluargaan. Solidaritas juga tampak dalam banyak seruan Paulus untuk memulihkan kesatuan apabila ia berhadapan dengan perpecahan, dan teristimewa dalam menggambarkan jemaat sebagai satu tubuh Kristus dengan banyak anggota yang berbeda dan saling membutuhkan serta memberi. Dalam konteks kolekte-kolekte sebagai tanda solidaritas antarjemaat, Paulus secara eksplisit menunjuk kepada solidaritas Kristus dengan kita sebagai dasar terdalam dari solidaritas antarumat. Kata-kata kunci: Solidaritas, persekutuan, David Horrell, Paulus, etika, baptisan, Perjamuan Tuhan, saudara-saudara, Tubuh Kristus, solidaritas Kristus. (shrink)

This treatise on aesthetics begins by showing that the word "art" is used as a name not only for "art proper" but also for certain things which are "art falsely so called." These are craft or skill, magic, and amusement, each of which, by confusion with art proper, generates a false aesthetic theory. In the course of attacking these theories the author criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers a new theory of magic, and reinterprets Plato's so-called "attack on art," (...) showing that it has been entirely misunderstood. Finally, he draws important inferences concerning the position of art in human society. (shrink)

A central theme in the scholarly literature on Enlightenment Europe concerns the increased focus on the role of reason in the development of European thought, especially in the development of the new science by the natural philosophers. As a consequence, there is a tendency in both philosophical scholarship and teaching to bind philosophy and science tightly together. While there is certainly much that is correct in this approach, one motivation for pluralizing philosophy’s past is that this story leaves out a (...) great deal that is important in Enlightenment views of reason. We argue, using as an example the work of figures like Margaret Cavendish, that reason was significantly broader in scope—and that developments in science were paralleled by equally important advances in music, art, literature, medicine, philosophy, and other areas. In recognizing the lack of a sharp boundary between these areas, an inclusive canon of Enlightenment philosophy gives us this richer notion of reason. Integrating figures such as Cavendish into the canon helps us to see that the narrow focus on the scientific version of reason within Enlightenment scholarship creates a false distinction between science and the humanities and misses out on the humanistic ends for which we engage in philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL TO FREGE, 24 MAY 1903: "I BELIEVE I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT CLASSES ARE ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS" GREGORY LANDINI Philosophy / University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242, USA It was his consideration of Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal, Russell recalls in My Philosophical Development, that led in the spring of 1901 to the discovery of the paradox of the class of all classes not members of (...) themselves. "Never glad confident morning again", were Whitehead's reported words (MPD, p. 58). Whitehead was, of course, wrong. Russell had many new confident mornings. One in particular apparently occurred on 19 May 1903. On 23 May Russell wrote in his journal: "Four days ago 1 solved the Contradiction -the relief of this is unspeakable" (Papm 12: 24). The "solution" was communicated to Whitehead, who responded by telegram: "Heartiest congratulations Aristoteles secundus. 1 am delighted" (Clark, p. III). But it was not long before Russell knew his proposal was inadequate. On the form he would scrawl: "A propos of solVing the Contradiction. [But the solution was wrong]" (ibid; Russell's brackets). The episode is intriguing. What was the proposal? Russell's correspondence with Frege sheds some light. On 20 October 1902 Frege had sent a letter suggesting a way to avoid the contradiction. Frege's suggestion, formulated in a great hurry so that it might appear in the Appendix of Vol. II of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, was to abandon his Basic Law V; zcj>z =zez. ==. (x)(x. ==. ex), and to replace it by Russell to Frege, 24 May I903 161 V' zz =zez. ==. (x)(x *zz & x* zez: ~ : x. ==. ex). The underlying idea was to accept that one concept may have the same extension as another even though the two concepts are not coextensive. Though he thought the underlying idea "probably correct",! Russell expressed reservation in a reply of 12 December:... I find it difficult to accept your solution even though it is probably correct. Do you deny, e.g., that all classes form a class? And if this is admitted, then it is possible that - ana. Moreover, the class of non-humans is a. non-human. Otherwise it must be admitted that not ail objects fall either under a or not-a; namely, if a is a range of values, then a fails neither under a nor under not-a. This contradicts the law of excluded middle, which will be inconvenient to say the least.2 (Frege I980, p. 151) Frege's response of 28 December does not mention the contradiction, and Volume II of his Grundgesetze appeared early in 1903. Russell's reservations concerning Frege's solution· continue in a letter to Frege of 20 February 1903: What you say about my contradiction is of the greatest interest to me. Do you believe that the range of values remains unchanged if some subclass of the class is assigned to it as a new member? Extension seems to fit this view better than intension. Bur I fe;el far from clear about this question. (Frege I980, p. 155) Frege replied on 21 May, explaining that in general a class does not remain unchanged when a particular subclass is added to it, but that two concepts may have the same extension (the same class) when the only difference between them is that this class falls under the first concept but not under the second (p. 157). Then on 24 May 1903 Russell excitedly wrote Frege of a solution of the paradox of classes: "I received your letter this morning, and 1 am replying to it at once, for russell: the Journal of the Berrrand Russdl Archives McMasrer University Library Press n.S.•2 (wincer 1992-93): 160-85 ISSN 0036-01631 • The same evaluation appears in Russell's Appendix to The Principles ofMathematics (p. 522). 2 Frege's '\- a II b" is Peano and Russell's "a E b". Russell should have put "~ana". 162 GREGORY LANDINI I believe I have discovered that classes are entirely superfluous. Your designation i(z) can be used for itself, and x E i(z) for (x).... this seems to me to avoid the contradiction" (p. 159). The proposal is also mentioned in a... (shrink)

To incorporate medical ethics into clinical practice, it must first be understood and valued by health care professionals. The recognition of this principle led to an expanding and continuing educational effort by the ethics committee of the Vancouver General Hospital. This paper reviews this venture, including some pitfalls and failures, as well as successes. Although we began with consultants, it quickly became apparent that education in medical ethics must reach all health care professionals—and medical students as well. Our greatest successes (...) came in the formative years of a medical career (ie, in medical school and residency training programmes), but other efforts were not wasted, particularly among nurses and other health care professionals.Although this is a personal review of the experience in one institution, the lessons learnt in Vancouver are applicable to the further development of medical ethics in the UK. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

resumo No chama do período do “estrutura l i s mo” defendeu-se a id é ia de que havia uma oposição ent re essa filosof ia e o idealismo, especia l mente o ide a l i s mo subjetivo. O propósito deste texto é defender a tese oposta, de que há um forte elo interno entre o criticismo kantiano e o método estrutural em história da filosofia. Esse elo é partic u l a r me nte visível no estrutura (...) l i s mo e na Dia no e m á t ica de Gueroult e também pode ser ilustrado na obra do grande intérprete da filosofia kantiana que é Louis Guillermit. Este aplicou seu método de “elucidação crítica” à interpretação da sistematicida de de todo o período crítico de Ka nt e especia l me nte da constituição pro g ressiva da Estética transcendental nas três Críticas. A eluc idação da gênese das estruturas perma nece int e r na ao sistema ka ntia no, de i xando em aberto a questão da natureza de sua ligação com os sistemas pós-kantianos, mas essa neutralida de é mais apare nte que real, e cons o a nte com a escolha do idealismo kantia no em detrimento do idealismo hegeliano. palavras- chave Estrutura l i s mo; Dia no e m á t ica; elucidação crítica; Ma r t ial Gueroult; Louis Guillermit; Idealismo alemão. (shrink)

This full-length study of Plato's dialogue Phaedrus, now in paperback, is written in the belief that such concerted scrutiny of a single dialogue is an important part of the project of understanding Plato so far as possible 'from the inside' - of gaining a feel for the man's philosophy. The focus of this account is on how the resources both of persuasive myth and of formal argument, for all that Plato sets them in strong contrast, nevertheless complement and reinforce each (...) other in his philosophy. Not only is the dialogue in its formal structure a dovetail of myth and argument, but the philosophic life that it praises is also shaped by an acknowledgement of the limitations of argument and the importance of mythical understanding. By means of this correlation of form and content Plato invites his readers, through the very act of reading, to take a first step along the path of the philosophical life. (shrink)

There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offenders will reoffend. Commentators have raised several ethical concerns regarding this practice. One prominent concern is that, when imposed without the offender’s valid consent, neurointerventions might infringe offenders’ right to bodily integrity. While it is commonly held that we possess a moral right to bodily integrity, the extent to which this right would protect against such neurointerventions is as-yet unclear. In this paper, we will assess (...) whether, why, and how severely three forms of neurointervention might infringe the right to bodily integrity. We show that the severity of the infringement of the right to bodily integrity differs across different forms of neurointervention. Moreover, we argue that mental and behavioral effects of neurointerventions could in some cases be relevant to determining the severity of infringements of the right to bodily integrity. (shrink)

A intenção deste artigo é primàriamente exegética. Não pretende chegar a conclusães filosóficas substanciais nem fazer uma apreciação crítica. Pretende simplesmente esclarecer a versão de Russell quanto ao atomismo lógico, apresentando a sua teoria do juízo empírico num contexto histórico. A maior parte dos comentários contemporâneos falham neste ponto; contudo, afigura-se impossível compreender perfeitamente a teoria de Russell aeerca do conhecimento, bem como a Teoria das Descrições, como parte integrante daquela teoria, se não for encarada como uma tentativa para evitar (...) as consequencias de certas teorias alternativas do juízo. Pensa o autor que muitas críticas contemporâneas da Teoria das Descrições estão deslocadas, simplesmente por não conseguirem apreender o papel que aquela teoria devia desempenhar na análise russelliana do juízo empírico. A título de exemplo tenta o autor mostrar como as críticas de P. F. Strawson a respeito da Teoria das Descrições, como foram formuladas no seu artigo On Referring, não vêm a propósito (cf. Secção VT). A principal comparação histórica aqui apresentada refere-se à teoria idealista do juízo de F. H. Bradley. Contudo, parece também importante salientar o acordo que existe entre Russell e Bradley quanto a rejeitar como inadequado o tipo de análise do juízo apresentado por Leibniz e, numa primeira etapa da sua carreira, por G. E. Moore. Leibniz e Moore apresentaram, em moldes diversos, aquilo a que podíamos chamar teorias 'essencialmente genéricas' do juízo. Para Leibniz uma proposição é uma conexão analitica de conceitos, para Moore uma proposição é uma conexão sintética de conceitos. Tanto Russell como Bradley afirmam que é impossível formular uma teoria do juízo satisfatória, se concebermos a relação entre uma mente e uma proposição, implicada no juízo, como uma simples conexao de conceitos. O juízo deve ser apresentado como algo que implica experiência imediata pré-conceitual, experiência essa que, embora em si mesma não seja capaz de verdade ou falsidade, está pressuposta na própria possibilidade de qualquer juízo, verdadeiro ou falso, acerca da realidade. Dum modo geral, podíamos dizer que um juízo, cujo conteúdo é conceitual, é em virtude da experiência imediata que 'atinge a realidade' ('reaches right up to reality'). Contudo, embora Russell e Bradley concordem neste ponto, a análise da experiência imediata apresentada pelo primeiro é muito diferente da do segundo. Na medida em que se pode falar duma tese exegética positiva neste artigo, dir-se-ia que a análise russelliana da experiência imediata, contida na sua doutrina do 'conhecimento por experiência directa' dos particulares na sensação, é formulada especificamente (a) para ser compatível com a existência dum universo pluralista de particulares externamente relacionados e (b) para permitir uma versão da teoria de correspondência da verdade. Por outras palavras, a análise russelliana do juízo empírico, implicando necessàriamente um 'conhecimento por experiência directa' dos particulares na sensação, foi formulada especìficamente para evitar as consequências que, tanto Bradley como Russell, viram seeguir-se da análise idealista do juízo. Isto ilustra uma diferença fundamental entre o método filosófico de Russell e o de Bradley. Bradley aceita o monismo, a irrealidade das relações externas, e a teoria de coerência da verdade como consequência da sua teoria inicial do juízo. Russell, por outro lado, pensa que estas consequências se tornaram inaceitáveis perante a prática e as descobertas da ciência empírica; e tenta, por isso, construir uma teoria do juízo compatível com o tipo de metafísica e com a teoria da verdade, que lhe parece serem exigidos pela ciência empírica. (Resumo do Autor. Trad. A. M.). (shrink)